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We examine the incentive e￿ects of funding contracts on entrepreneurial e￿ort
decisions and allocative e￿ciency. We experiment with four types of contracts (stan-
dard debt contract, outside equity, non-monotonic contract, full-subsidy contract)
that di￿er in the structure of investor repayment and, therefore, in the incentives for
entrepreneurial e￿ort provision. Theoretically the replacement of a standard debt
contract by a repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contract reduces e￿ort distor-
tions and increases e￿ciency. We test this non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis in
the laboratory as well.
Our results reveal that the incentive e￿ects of funding contracts need to be
experienced before they re￿ect in observed behavior. With su￿cient experience
observed behavior is consistent with the theoretical predictions and supports the non-
monotonic-contracts hypothesis: we ￿nd that the replacement of a standard debt
contract by a repayment-neutral non-monotonic contract increases entrepreneurial
income by 170% and total surplus by 30% in our setting.
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11 Introduction
There are many real-life instances of individuals facing the opportunity of conducting a
￿project￿ that yields risky returns. Cases in point range from starting entrepreneurship
to students aiming for a University degree. Typically project execution requires ￿xed
setup costs that exceed the available funds of the project’s owner-manager (henceforth
entrepreneur) and are ￿nanced by outside investors, e.g. the market for loans, the market
for equity, or government subsidy programs.
The speci￿ed terms of repayment to the investor form an integral element of outside
￿nancing and can di￿er considerably; e.g., 1) government agencies subsidizing unemployed
workers to start entrepreneurship may require no repayment at all; 2) an entrepreneur
may take out a loan requiring the repayment of either a constant amount or all of the
available assets in case of bankruptcy; 3) student loan programs may ask students to
repay less if more successful in their studies than their fellows; 4) all potential returns to
entrepreneurship may be divided at a speci￿ed share between entrepreneur and investor.
Since the entrepreneur can improve the prospects of higher returns by exerting more
e￿ort, the division of yet uncertain returns between entrepreneur and investor that is ￿xed
in the funding contract potentially a￿ects the entrepreneur’s e￿ort choice. This raises the
question of how the incentives inherent in funding contracts shape the entrepreneurial
outcome. The purpose of this paper is to investigate experimentally how funding contracts
in￿uence entrepreneurial behavior and to inquire into their implications for allocative
e￿ciency.
This setting of external ￿nance with hidden e￿ort and limited liability is analyzed
theoretically in the seminal paper by Innes (1990). He shows that standard debt contracts
induce ine￿ciently low e￿ort, thus leading to substantial e￿ciency losses. In contrast,
non-monotonic contracts can overcome this problem under a wide range of parameter
choices. If designed accordingly, they can induce e￿cient e￿ort choices. In our experiment
we set out to test this non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis and compare behavior with
a standard debt contract to that observed with a non-monotonic contract yielding the
same expected repayment to the investor. To obtain a more complete picture of the
incentive e￿ects of funding contracts we also study behavioral responses to outside equity
and no-repayment1 contracts since these contracts are also frequently used in real life.
We ￿nd that the incentive e￿ects of funding contracts are too subtle to be grasped
by introspection alone. At the beginning of the experiment we ￿nd no di￿erences in en-
trepreneurial behavior across contract conditions at all. This is of particular importance
in the studied setting since many real-life entrepreneurs are similarly inexperienced when
relying on external ￿nance for the ￿rst, and possibly only, time. Nevertheless the di￿er-
ential theoretical predictions strongly attract behavior over the course of the experiment.
1For simplicity we refer to all cases where the entrepreneur can always keep the entire return to the
project as cases with a no-repayment contract, even if no explicit repayment contract was written; for
example, if the entrepreneurial project is fully subsidized or if entrepreneurs do not rely on external
￿nance and self-￿nance their projects instead.
2With accumulating experience behavior moves closer to the theoretical point predictions
and the comparative statics predictions across funding contracts apply. With su￿cient
experience, behavior is consistent with the theoretical point predictions.
This paper contributes to the growing experimental literature on credit markets since,
to the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst study that inquires into the incentive ef-
fects of funding contracts and investigates the non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis. An
experimental study related to our setting is Serra-Garcia (2010) that explores the e￿ects
of collateral. She observes a positive relationship between collateral and entrepreneurial
e￿ort which, in contrast to standard theory, emerges only if the repayment to the investor
is su￿ciently low. Other experimental studies of credit markets include Brown and Zehn-
der (2007, 2010) investigating the e￿ect of information dissemination of loan defaults on
repayment behavior and Fehr and Zehnder (2006) studying the role of reputation in credit
markets.
Our ￿ndings also complement the literature on moral hazard. 2 In this literature it is
natural to model the principal-agent relationship such that the residual claimant owns the
project (principal) and￿to execute the project￿requires someone else (agent) to provide
an unobserved input (e￿ort). Our setting, in contrast, allows us to explore the diametral
case in which the residual claimant owning the project is the same contract party as that
providing the unobservable input (e￿ort). This assumption is natural in our setting since
the entrepreneur owns the project and executes it. A second party (investor) is needed
here since the execution of the project requires the provision of an indispensable input
(external funding) that the entrepreneurs lacks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical foundation of our
experimental research, section 3 summarizes the experimental design, section 4 reports
our experimental results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical considerations
This section ￿rst outlines a simple model of entrepreneurial external ￿nancing that serves
as the foundation for our experimental investigation. Second, it reviews the non-monotonic-
contracts hypothesis that compares entrepreneurial e￿ort under a standard debt contract
to that under a non-monotonic contract. Third, the entrepreneur’s optimal e￿ort decision
is related to outside equity contracts.
2E.g., DeJong, Forsythe and Lundholm (1985) demonstrate the relevance of moral hazard with ￿at
wage employment contracts. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) and Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005) show
that agents’ e￿ort increases in the generosity of ￿at wages. Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2007), on the other
hand, report that bonus contracts outperform ￿at wage contracts while Brandts and Charness (2004)
investigate the impact of competitive imbalances and minimum wages. Contract design has been show to
also a￿ect behavior in the ￿eld, e.g., Lazear (2000) ￿nds that replacing ￿at rate hourly pay by piece rates
for windshield installers increases productivity while Shearer (2004) reports a similar e￿ect for workers
in tree-planting.
32.1 A simple model of funding
The outlined model is a discrete variant of Innes (1990). Consider an entrepreneurial
project with random return Z. The underlying probability function is such that greater
entrepreneurial e￿ort increases the likelihood of outcomes with high returns. There are n
states. The project return in state i is denoted by zi  0. Return states are numbered in
ascending order, i.e. zi < zj if i < j. The probability of state i depends on entrepreneurial
e￿ort x 2 [0;x] and is given by pi(x)  0 where pi(x) is twice-di￿erentiable. For a
proper probability distribution assume
P
i pi(x) = 1 and
P
i p0
i(x) = 0. To model that
greater e￿ort increases the probability for higher return states to occur, suppose that the
monotone likelihood ratio property is satis￿ed, ie. for all zi < zj we have p0
i(x)=pi(x) <
p0
j(x)=pj(x) implying @E[Zjx]=@x > 0, cf. Milgrom (1981). To ensure an interior solution,
suppose marginal bene￿t of e￿ort does not grow to in￿nity, i.e. limx!x @E[Zjx]=@x is
￿nite.
The project requires start-up cost   > z1.3 The entrepreneur is endowed with
wealth W. The amount of external ￿nance required to start the project is D      W.
Since we inquire into the e￿ects of external ￿nancing schemes on entrepreneurial activity,
D > 0. For simplicity, let W = 0. We assume the entrepreneur is subject to limited
liability such that the realized project return constrains repayment in low return states.
A feasible repayment contract ~ t is characterized by ~ t = (t1;t2;:::;tn) such that ti  zi due
to limited liability, where ti denotes the contracted amount of repayment in state i.
The preferences of the entrepreneur are additively separable in income y and e￿ort
cost c(x)
u(x;y) = y   c(x)
where c(0) = 0, c0(x) > 0, c00(x) > 0 and limx!x c0(x) = 1. Since the entrepreneur’s
income in state i is the di￿erence of realized project return and contracted repayment,
the entrepreneur’s maximization problem for any given contract ~ t is given by:
max
x EU(x;~ t ) =
n X
i=1
pi(x)(zi   ti)   c(x):
Expected utility is maximized by e￿ort level e x(~ t ). For ease of exposition, let c(x) be suf-
￿ciently concave to always guarantee strict concavity of the objective function. Then, the
￿rst order condition of the maximization problem characterizes a unique global maximum












3If the start-up cost is not larger than the lowest project return z1, the ￿nancing problem is trivial.
4Due to the generality of feasible contracts and revenue distributions, it is possible to ￿nd contracts
that imply a strictly negative marginal entrepreneurial income net of repayment even with zero e￿ort
(e.g., a contract that always requires full repayment except for the lowest state where no repayment is
required.) Then, it is impossible to satisfy the ￿rst-order condition (1) and a boundary solution emerges
such that e x(~ t ) = 0.
4The LHS of (1) gives the marginal expected project return of additional e￿ort. The ￿rst
term of the RHS is marginal e￿ort cost.
The key to understanding how entrepreneurial incentives are related to funding con-




i(x)ti. If the repayment contract implies that the marginal expected re-
payment vanishes from (1), the entrepreneur ￿nds it optimal to supply ￿rst-best e￿ort
x that prevails in the absence of external ￿nancing ( ti = 0 8i); hence, any ￿at contract
(ti =  8i) induces ￿rst-best e￿ort.5
If the funding contract is designed such that the marginal expected repayment, how-
ever, does not sum up to zero, the funding contract distorts the entrepreneur’s e￿ort
choice and leads to ine￿cient e￿ort provision and a loss of economic surplus. Speci￿cally,
the entrepreneur’s optimal e￿ort e x decreases in the marginal expected repayment as the







i(e x)zi   c00(e x)   MR
0(e x)
< 0:
The denominator is the maximization problem’s second-order condition so that a strictly
positive marginal expected repayment implies e x < x resulting in lost economic surplus.
Since the incentive e￿ects of funding contracts are re￿ected in the marginal expected
repayment to the investor, they are in￿uenced by the structure of the funding contracts.
A contract that does not require any repayment induces the entrepreneur to exert ￿rst-
best e￿ort. In the following two subsections we discuss the incentive e￿ects of three other
contract structures, standard debt contracts, non-monotonic contracts, and outside equity
contracts.
2.2 The standard debt contract and the non-monotonic-contracts
hypothesis
A widely applied funding contract is the standard debt contract that essentially reduces
the repayment structure to a ￿at repayment claim  independent of the realized return
state. Due to binding limited liability, the actual repayment to the lender is smaller than
 whenever the realized project return falls short o￿ the ￿at repayment claim. Using our





zi if zi < ;
 otherwise.
Under a standard debt contract, the entrepreneur shares with the lender the bene￿t of
increased expected project return created by additional e￿ort while bearing total marginal




i(x) = 0 otherwise probability would sum up to more or less than unity with variations
of e￿ort.
5expected repayment is strictly positive, so that the standard debt contract is inherently
ine￿cient. To see this, note that the expected repayment to the lender under any standard




i=m pi(x) where m is the smallest payo￿
state that allows the entrepreneur to fully repay the ￿xed payment of the standard debt
contract. Rewriting the expected repayment and di￿erentiating it with respect to e￿ort



























i = 0, so that the ￿rst summation vanishes. All other summations di￿er
from the ￿rst one in that marginal probabilities for low revenue states are not part of the
summation. The fact that higher e￿ort reduces the probability of low states and increases
that of high states implies that the lowest payo￿ states are assigned negative marginal
probabilities, so that, when omitting them, all remaining summations are strictly posi-
tive. It follows that the marginal expected repayment under any standard debt contract
is always strictly positive and, henceforth, the induced entrepreneurial e￿ort choice is
suboptimal.
Nevertheless it is possible to design Pareto-improving contracts that can overcome the
ine￿ciency inherent to standard debt contracts. These contracts are characterized by a
non-monotonic repayment structure in the sense that repayment in some higher-return
states is lower than repayment in some lower-return states. By decreasing repayment
in high-return states, marginal repayment to the lender - being strictly positive under
standard debt contracts - is reduced while the expected repayment to the lender can be
preserved. It follows that the deviation from ￿rst-best e￿ort and the implied e￿ciency
loss with non-monotonic contracts are smaller than under standard debt contracts due to
better incentives provided by the former. If designed accordingly, non-monotonic contracts
can even lead the entrepreneur to exert ￿rst-best e￿ort and eliminate any e￿ciency loss
(Proposition 1b).
Proposition 1. (Non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis)
There exist non-monotonic contracts that are superior to standard debt contracts in terms
of entrepreneurial pro￿t and allocative e￿ciency due to a smaller deviation from ￿rst-best
e￿ort.
Proof. See appendix A.
A numerical example that illustrates the potential magnitude of welfare gains through
non-monotonic contracts which we experimentally investigate is provided in section 3.
62.3 Outside equity contracts
Outside equity contracts are a special case of monotonic contracts where the repayment
to the investor is higher if the entrepreneur’s revenue realization is higher, ti < tj if i < j.
For outside equity contracts, the share of investor repayment in revenue is the same in
any state. We denote the share of investor repayment by  2 (0;1] and also refer to it as
the equity share. Then any outside equity contract ~ t Equi is de￿ned by
t
Equi
i () =  zi (i = 1;:::;n)
3 Experimental design
3.1 Model parametrization, treatments, and theoretical predic-
tions
In the experiment, we implement the model introduced in section 2 with three states and
linear probability functions. Project revenues and probability functions for states 1, 2,
and 3 to occur are as follows:
z1 = 500 ECU with p1(x) = 0:6   0:6 x
100,
z2 = 9;000 ECU with p2(x) = 0:4,
z3 = 10;000 ECU with p3(x) = 0:6 x
100,
where e￿ort x 2 [0;100]. By increasing e￿ort, probability is shifted from the low project
return of 500 ECU to the high project return of 10,000 ECU. This can be thought of as
probability mass being shifted from the low to the intermediate return to the same extent
as from the intermediate to the high return.
The entrepreneur faces e￿ort cost c(x) = 0:5x2. The start-up investment of the project
is ￿xed at   = 3;120 ECU. The rate of return an outside lender requires to ￿nance the
project is r = 0:25.
We investigate four treatments that di￿er in the speci￿cation of the repayment con-
tract only. To minimize confounding e￿ects that could emerge from social preferences or
strategic uncertainty, we use an individual-choice experiment where incentive structures
are set exogenously by the experimenter and are not a￿ected by the actual choice behav-
ior of the subjects in the experiment. This aspect of our design captures the anonymous
setting in much of the ￿nancial markets since funding contracts are frequently o￿ered
through ￿nancial institutions like banks where social preferences seem less relevant. 6 We
investigate four treatments that di￿er in the speci￿cation of the exogenously chosen re-
payment contract only: As a benchmark we run a self-￿nancing treatment (NoRepay),
in which there is no repayment at all. Furthermore, we study a standard-debt-contract
condition (SDC), a non-monotonic-contract condition (NMC), and an equity condition
6Reiss and Wol￿ (2011) endogenize the selection of repayment contracts and study the structures of
subject-selected repayment contracts and their e￿ects on entrepreneurial e￿ort choice.
7(EQUI), in which subjects are exposed to the respective kind of repayment contract. The
required expected repayment to the lender, (1 + r) , determines the state-contingent
repayments under the standard debt contract and the non-monotonic contract. Impor-
tantly, both contracts lead to the same expected repayment of 3,900 ECU. In contrast,
state-contingent repayments under equity are chosen such that the e￿ort prediction equals
the e￿ort prediction prevailing under the standard debt contract of 15.7. This requires
that the state-independent equity share is 72.5%. Table 1 summarizes all repayment
contracts. Evidently, the standard debt contract and the equity contract lead to a loss
Repayment SDC NMC NoRepay EQUI (72.5%)
t1 (z1=500) 500:00 ECU 500:00 ECU 0:00 ECU 362:50 ECU
t2 (z2 = 9000) 7;383:30 ECU 9;000:00 ECU 0 ECU 6;525:00 ECU
t3 (z3 = 10000) 7;383:30 ECU 500:00 ECU 0 ECU 7;250:00 ECU
E￿ort prediction 15:7 57:0 57:0 15:7
Total surplus 1;551:66 ECU 2;404:50 ECU 2;404:50 ECU 1;551:66 ECU
Exp. Repayment 3;900:00 ECU 3;900:00 ECU 0:00 ECU 3;476:30 ECU
Entrepreneur’s EU 769:93 ECU 1;624:50 ECU 2;404:50 ECU 1;195:35 ECU
Investor’s EU 780:00 ECU 780:00 ECU 0:00 ECU 356:20 ECU
Table 1: Repayment contracts by treatment
in total surplus. Additionally, the entrepreneur’s payo￿ is substantially smaller. If the
standard debt contract is replaced by a repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contract,
total surplus increases by 55%, while the surplus accruing to the entrepreneur more than
doubles.7
Behavior in the laboratory that deviates from our theory-based predictions which
assume risk-neutrality may be attributable to the e￿ects of individual risk preferences
such as various degrees of risk-aversion. To address this concern, we reduce the risk
in subjects’ payo￿s by paying them the average payo￿ over 50 di￿erent projects, with
outcomes determined by independent draws from the probability distribution determined
by e￿ort choice instead of using the payo￿ realized for a single project. This method was
successfully introduced by Kirchkamp, Reiss, and Sadrieh (2006) in an auction setting.
3.2 Procedures and other details
The experiment was programmed using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and run at the Erfurt
Laboratory for Experimental Economics (eLab). Subjects were recruited for each session
using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). No subject participated in more than one session. We ran
one session for each treatment, obtaining twelve independent observations per treatment.
On the day, subjects were welcomed and randomly assigned to private cabins. Written
instructions were handed to them before being read aloud by the experimenter. Subse-
7The exact numbers are 54.96% and 110.99%.
8quently, subjects entered their cubicles and had some time to go over the instructions
again and ask any questions they might have. Questions were answered individually.
Subjects played 15 repetitions of the game and were paid according to their individual
performance. The experimental sessions lasted for one hour or less, average earnings being
¤ 9.65 ( US$ 12.50). Payments were settled individually to ensure subjects’ anonymity.
3.3 Testable hypotheses
We derive the hypotheses that we test in the experiment from the theoretical predictions
summarized in Table 1. At the least demanding level we expect that e￿ort choices are
in￿uenced by the contract condition in a systematic way. In particular, we hypothesize
that observed behavior is qualitatively consistent with the comparative statics of changing
the funding contract. This leads to our ￿rst and most basic hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Observed e￿ort choices are in￿uenced by contract conditions and share
the ordinal rank across contract conditions with the theoretical ranking prediction :
xNoRepay  xNMC > xSDC  xEQUI.
Hypothesis 1 is weak in the sense that it is a qualitative one that disregards the quanti-
tative nature of the theoretical point predictions. Since the precise optimal e￿ort values
allow us to predict behavior also quantitatively we strengthen the ￿rst hypothesis by
hypothesizing that behavior is also consistent with the point predictions:
Hypothesis 2a Observed e￿ort choices on average match the theoretical point predic-
tions of e￿ort.
A particular strength of the model is its parsimony. It provides a single equation,
equation (1), that predicts the e￿ort level for any repayment contract. Although hy-
pothesis 2a relates to the optimal e￿ort equation, it hypothesizes on the comparisons
of observed e￿ort to predicted e￿ort for each contract condition separately. This allows
for some ￿exibility as the point prediction of some contract condition may ￿t the data
for some repayment contract better than for another repayment contract. To strengthen
our hypothesis on the theory’s predictive power, hypothesis 2b supposes that the optimal
e￿ort prediction holds for all repayment contracts at the same time:
Hypothesis 2b The optimal e￿ort function (1) explains observed e￿ort choices well in
all contract conditions simultaneously.
The non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis compares allocative e￿ciency and pro￿ts ob-
tained under the non-monotonic contract to that under a standard debt contract yielding
the same expected investor repayment theoretically.
Hypothesis 3 (Non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis) Allocative e￿ciency and entrepreneurial
pro￿ts are higher under the non-monotonic contract than under the standard debt contract.
94 Experimental results
First we investigate if incentives matter, then we explore learning dynamics and ￿nally,
we examine the non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis.
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The ￿gure depicts average e￿ort (solid lines) over rounds under the standard debt contract
(left), the non-monotonic contract (second-left), if there is no repayment (second-right), and
under outside equity (right). The theoretical e￿ort prediction is indicated by dashed lines.
Figure 1: Average e￿ort and predicted e￿ort by round
Let us begin by addressing the fundamental question if funding contracts a￿ect behav-
ior at all and, if so, see to what extent it is consistent with the theoretical predictions. In
the experiment, any incentive e￿ect of funding contracts should be re￿ected directly in the
observed e￿ort choices. Figure 1 depicts average e￿ort by treatment and by round. The
patterns of the average e￿ort paths across the contract types show that funding contracts
embody incentives strongly a￿ecting behavior. Strikingly, hypothesis 1 on comparative
statics seems to be con￿rmed entirely. The paths of average e￿ort, fxt;t = 1;:::;15g,














t . This impression is formally con￿rmed by testing for di￿erences
in average e￿ort among any pair of contract conditions, separately for each round, using
two-tailed t-tests,8 see Table 5 for a summary. The table shows the number of signi￿cant
8We also checked for treatment di￿erences using the Mann-Whitney U test and essentially ￿nd the
10Contract condition NMC NoRepay EQUI
SDC xSDC < xNMC xSDC < xNoRepay xSDC = xEQUI
No. of sign. di￿s. 13 (p  0:028) 12 (p  0:066) 2 (p  0:034)
No. of insign. di￿s. 2 (p  0:229) 3 (p  0:290) 13 (p  0:167)
NMC xNMC = xNoRepay xNMC > xEQUI
No. of sign. di￿s. 1 (p = 0:028) 14 (p  0:011)
No. of insign. di￿s. 14 (p  0:123) 1 (p = 0:590)
NoRepay xNoRepay > xEQUI
No. of sign. di￿s. 14 (p  0:047)
No. of insign. di￿s. 1 (p = 0:661)
The table reports, for any pair of treatments, the results of roundwise t-tests. The null hypothesis is that
there is no di￿erence in the average e￿ort observed in the paired treatments. The alternative hypothesis
is that there is a di￿erence. For any comparison of treatments, the theoretical comparative statics e￿ort
prediction and the number of signi￿cant and insigni￿cant di￿erences out of all of the 15 roundwise tests
are reported together with the obtained highest and lowest p-values in parenthesis.
Table 2: Summary of t-tests comparing average e￿ort across contract conditions.
and insigni￿cant di￿erences of average e￿ort that we ￿nd for each pair of contract con-
ditions. The test results indicate that we observe signi￿cant di￿erences in average e￿ort
in almost all of the rounds for all cases where theory predicts di￿erences in average e￿ort
between contract conditions. Similarly, for all cases where theory predicts that average
e￿ort does not di￿er across contract conditions, in almost all of these rounds we do not
observe signi￿cant di￿erences. Hence, there is strong support for hypothesis 1.
Comparing the paths of average e￿ort to the theoretical predictions, as indicated by
the dashed lines in Figure 1, illustrates that observed behavior is, however, much richer
than predicted by theory. For example, in contrast to the static prediction for the contract
condition SDC, xSDC = 15:7, observed average e￿ort changes considerably over the course
of the experiment as can be seen in the left panel of the ￿gure. The graph for the contract
condition SDC (left panel) shows that nevertheless, the static prediction turns out to
be rather useful as it attracts observed average e￿ort over time. Overall, the standard
debt contract leads subjects to implement ine￿ciently low levels of e￿ort consistent with
theory most of the time but not in the beginning of the experiment: In the ￿rst two
rounds of the experiment average e￿ort does not di￿er from the ￿rst-best level of x = 57
(p > 0:185), inconsistent with the theoretical prediction for the SDC condition. For all of
the remaining 13 rounds, the t-test indicates signi￿cant di￿erences between average e￿ort
and ￿rst-best e￿ort (two-tailed, p < 0:075).9 Comparing the data to the theoretical point
prediction of ine￿cient e￿ort, xSDC = 15:7, shows that average e￿ort mostly di￿ers from
this prediction except for the end of the experiment: According to the t-test, average e￿ort
same results. [ Referees: Please see the referee’s appendix on p.30 for a summary of the MWU test
results. ]
9Similarly, the sign test reveals signi￿cant di￿erences between observed median e￿ort and ￿rst-best
e￿ort in 10 of 15 rounds (two-tailed, p < 0:007); for the remaining ￿ve rounds at the beginning of the
experiment (rounds 1-4 and 8), observed di￿erences are insigni￿cant ( p > 0:145).
11is not signi￿cantly di￿erent from the predicted e￿ort level in 6 of 15 rounds (two-tailed,
p > 0:110) that happen to be at the end of the experiment (rounds 11-15 and round 9). It
identi￿es signi￿cant di￿erences for all other rounds ( p < 0:069).10 We explore the learning
of funding contract incentives in more detail in subsection 4.2.
Next, let us consider the outside equity contract in more detail. It is designed to induce
the same level of e￿ort as the standard debt contract, xEQ = xSDC = 15:7. Though average
e￿ort observed in the outside equity condition (right panel) evolves very similar to that
observed in the SDC condition (left panel), one subtle di￿erence between both paths
of average e￿ort is, perhaps, that the convergence behavior towards the theoretically
predicted e￿ort level seems slightly faster under the outside equity contract. This is
consistent with the results of roundwise comparisons of average e￿ort to its prediction
since deviations from the prediction fade away later in the SDC condition. In the EQUI
condition, the t-test ￿nds signi￿cant di￿erences in the ￿rst three rounds only (two-tailed,
p < 0:012 for rounds 1-3 and p > 0:104 for any other round), while it ￿nds a signi￿cant
di￿erence in each of the ￿rst eight rounds in the SDC condition. 11
In contrast to converging average behavior under the standard debt contract and under
the outside equity contract, there is neither converging nor diverging behavior under the
non-monotonic contract or under the no repayment contract. In the treatment conditions
NMC and NoRepay, ￿rst-round average e￿ort is close to the theoretical prediction of
xNMC = xNoRepay = 57 and seems to ￿uctuate in its neighborhood over time as can be seen
in Figure 1. In fact roundwise comparisons of average e￿ort to the predicted level do not
suggest a systematic trend over time. There are only a few signi￿cant di￿erences that seem
arbitrarily distributed over the course of the experiment in either treatment. Speci￿cally
the t-test reveals signi￿cant di￿erences in six rounds (1-2, 6, 8, 10, and 15, p < 0:081)
in condition NMC and signi￿cant di￿erences in four rounds (1 and 5-7, p < 0:099) in
condition NoRepay.12
Result 1. Funding contracts strongly in￿uence the choice of e￿ort in a way that is con-
sistent with the comparative statics predictions except for the beginning of the experiment
(support for hypothesis 1). Behavior adjusts to the theoretical point predictions through
repeated exposure to incentives over time (partial support for hypothesis 2a).
To quantify the extent to which the incentives of funding contracts in￿uence the e￿ort
choice once incentives have been absorbed, we estimate ￿rst-order condition (1) with data
from the second half of the experiment, i.e. rounds 9-15. In our parametrization, the
10The sign-test ￿nds no signi￿cant di￿erences in rounds 7-15 and round 3 (two-tailed, p > 0:146) and
reveals signi￿cant di￿erences in all other rounds ( p < 0:039).
11The sign test indicates signi￿cant di￿erences in rounds 1-2 and round 7 (two-tailed, p < 0:065) in
the EQUI treatment and ￿ve of the ￿rst six rounds ( p < 0:039 for rounds 1-2 and 4-6 and p = 0:146 for
round 5.)
12The sign test ￿nds signi￿cant di￿erences in rounds 4 and 15 ( p  0:039) in the NMC condition and
signi￿cant di￿erences in rounds 5 and 7 (p  0:039) in the NoRepay condition.
12coe￿cent robust  t p-value 95% conf interval
I) Unrestricted model (3)
(Intercept) 57.98 3.916 14.81 0.000 50.14 65.82
e t1 35.99 52.329 0.69 0.494 -68.76 140.73
e t2 -1.28 3.01 -0.43 0.671 -7.311 4.743
e t3 -5.98 0.622 -9.31 0.000 -7.037 -4.545
II) Restricted model (4)
(Intercept) 59.16 2.876 20.57 0.000 53.41 64.92
Marg. Repayment 0.89 0.090 9.94 0.000 0.71 1.07
Note: State-contingent repayments are normalized such that e ts = ts=1000.
Table 3: Estimation results of equations (3) and (4).
￿rst-order condition can be explicitly solved for optimal e￿ort and simpli￿es to
x




First, we estimate13 the unrestricted model
xit = 0 + 1e t1 + 2e t2 + 3e t3 + uit (3)
The dependent variable xit is the e￿ort choice of participant i in round t, e ts is the re-
payment in state s measured in thousands of ECU (i.e., e ts = ts=1000), and uit is the
residual. The unrestricted model does not impose any restriction derived from theory on
the speci￿cation apart from the linearity assumption. This allows us to explore if the
repayment in state 2, t2, a￿ects e￿ort choice though theoretically irrelevant and to check
if the repayments in states 1 and 3 in￿uence behavior similarly strong.
If observed behavior is fully consistent with theory, then we expect to estimate coef-
￿cients such that the optimal e￿ort function (2) is reproduced by speci￿cation (3), i.e.
b 0 = 57, b 1 = 6, b 2 not signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero, and b 3 =  6. Table 3 presents re-
gression results that are broadly consistent with theory. Although the estimates reproduce
essential features of the optimal e￿ort function, the joint hypothesis that the estimated
coe￿cients satisfy the theoretical point predictions precisely is rejected at 5.5%. 14
In our parametrization, the additional repayment to the investor arising if the en-
trepreneur devotes one more unit of e￿ort to the project, i.e. the marginal repayment, is





13We estimate this and the next model by OLS such that the computation of standard errors takes
into account that observations of the same individual might be correlated across time (Rogers, 1993).
14An F-test of the joint hypothesis I) b 0 = 57, II) b 1 =  c 3, III) b 1 = 6, IV) b 2 = 0 with F4;58 = 2:47
yields p = 0:055.
13It depends on the funding contract through the repayments in states 1 and 3 only. Com-
paring marginal repayment MR to the optimal e￿ort function (2) shows that optimal
e￿ort is simply given by ￿rst-best e￿ort, x = 57, reduced by the amount of marginal re-
payment. To quantify the e￿ect of a funding contract’s marginal repayment on e￿ort, we
regress observed e￿ort on marginal repayment using the following restricted speci￿cation:
xit = 0   1 6(e t3   e t1) + uit (4)
In this regression equation, coe￿cient 1 indicates the e￿ect of marginal repayment on
e￿ort. Theoretically we expect to ￿nd on estimate of b 1 = 1. Any positive estimate,
b 1 > 0, would indicate that reducing e￿ort would be correlated with changes in the
repayment contract that require greater repayment if the entrepreneur exerts additional
e￿ort. If we found an estimate of b 1 > 1, then observed e￿ort would respond excessively
strong to contractual changes that lead to changes of marginal repayment. In this case
a replacement of the standard debt contract (with strictly positive marginal repayment)
by a non-monotonic contract (with zero marginal repayment) would increase e￿ort by an
amount that is larger than predicted theoretically. Table 3 reports the estimation results.
It turns out that the coe￿cient on marginal repayment is not signi￿cantly di￿erent from
one (two-tailed t-test, p = 0:239). Therefore, on average, marginal repayment captures
the incentives provided by funding contracts on e￿ort choice as theoretically predicted.
Before moving on to study the learning of contract incentives in more detail, we summarize
our result on e￿ort choice behavior as compared to optimal choice:
Result 2. Observed average behavior is largely consistent with the theoretical point predic-
tions given by the optimal e￿ort choice function (1) once su￿cient experience accumulates
(partial support for hypothesis 2b).
4.2 Learning incentives
The fundamental di￿erences in the incentives provided by the experimentally studied
funding contracts seem not to be re￿ected in the observed e￿ort choices at the beginning
of the experiment according to a comparison of ￿rst-round e￿ort choices across contract
conditions, see the left panel of Figure 1. It may be unsurprising that the di￿erences
in funding contract incentives do not induce behavior that is in line with the point pre-
dictions precisely￿ but it is striking that there seem to be no di￿erences across contract
conditions in the ￿rst round at all. To look at this aspect in more detail we compare the
distributions of ￿rst-round e￿ort choices. The left panel of Figure 2 depicts the empiri-
cal cumulative distributions and shows that they are rather similar and independent of
the contract condition. In fact the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test applied to any pair of ￿rst-
round distributions fails to reject the hypothesis of identical distributions of observed
e￿ort choices at any reasonable level of signi￿cance ( p  0:777).
The failure of ￿nding signi￿cant di￿erences in ￿rst-round e￿ort behavior across these
contract conditions where it should matter, e.g. SDC as compared to NoRepay, is impor-
14tant. It suggests that the incentives provided by funding contracts are too weak or too
subtle to be grasped by ex ante introspection. The result that e￿ort choices change over
the course of the experiment towards the theoretical prediction reveals that repeated ex-
perience is required for contract incentives to take e￿ect. Only after su￿ciently-repeated
exposure to contract incentives is average behavior consistent with the theoretical predic-















































































Figure 2: Cumulative distribution functions of e￿ort observed in the ￿rst round (left
panel) and averaged over the last ￿ve rounds (right panel) of the experiment.
To further our understanding of how the incentives of funding contracts are learned and
to see if the shape of funding contracts a￿ects the way of learning incentives, we estimate
two learning models that have been applied in the previous literature, the experience-
weighted attraction learning model (EWA; see Camerer and Ho, 1999), and a reinforce-
ment learning model (RI; e.g., Roth and Erev, 1995).
4.2.1 Implementation of EWA and RI models
For details about the experienced-weighted attraction learning model, see Camerer and
Ho (1999), Ho, Xin, and Camerer (2008), or Feri, Irlenbusch, and Sutter (2010). In brief,
the EWA model describes a decision maker’s choice by mapping state variables associated
with actions, referred to as ’attractions’, into a probability distribution of choice variables.
EWA assumes that the attraction value Ax
t of choosing action x at the end of period t￿
after experiencing (or imagining) the payo￿ t(x) from choosing (or potentially choosing)





t 1 + e t(x)
Nt




(x) if x is chosen action in t
 (x) otherwise.
The parameter  discounts past attractions and the parameter  indicates the importance
of accumulated experience measured as the number of times the choice situation was ex-
perienced. An important di￿erence between EWA and RI models is that EWA allows for
attraction updating not only through experiencing payo￿s via the actually chosen action
but also through imagining payo￿s to unchosen actions. It captures any potential di￿er-
ence between the actual payo￿ experience and its imagination by discounting imagined
payo￿s at .
For mapping attractions into choice probabilities we use the logistic form so that the









where m is the number of actions. The parameter  indicates the sensitivity of choice
probabilities to attractions. E.g., there emerges random choice for  = 0 and with in-
creasing  choice converges to the payo￿-maximizing choice.
Before applying EWA to our setting we have to overcome two obstacles. First, the
choice variable of our interest, e￿ort, is continuous while EWA is designed for describing
discrete choice. We address this issue by discretizing the e￿ort space analogously to
Capra, Goeree, Gomez, and Holt (1999). In particular we round observed e￿ort to the
nearest integer so that there are m = 101 e￿ort choices, i.e. the discretized e￿ort space is
{0, 1,..., 100}. Second, unlike with discrete choice under certainty, in our setting payo￿
information is only partially available due to unknown realizations of project outcomes
that would have resulted from any unchosen e￿ort level: our participants are informed
about their actual payo￿s implied by the actual set of project realizations for the chosen
e￿ort levels, but they do not know the payo￿s that would have emerged for any unchosen
e￿ort level. Following Ho, Wang, and Camerer (2008) we replace the unknown payo￿ by
the average over the set of possible forgone payo￿s from the unchosen e￿ort level which
is the expected payo￿ in our case. 15 For consistency, we also replace the actual payo￿ by
the expected payo￿ conditional on the actually chosen e￿ort level. In our case this is a
minor change as the entrepreneur’s payo￿ in our experiment is the average payo￿ over
15Ho, Wang, and Camerer (2008) provide an extension of EWA to partial payo￿ information and apply
it to centipede game data.
1650 project realizations.16
Following Camerer (2003) and Ho, Camerer, and Chong (2007) we impose the restric-
tion N0 = 1. For specifying the levels of initial attraction, Ax
0, we use the approach of Ho,
Wang, and Camerer (2008, fn 16), also followed by Feri, Irlenbusch, and Sutter (2010), to
calibrate them such that the choice probabilities approximately 17 imply the distribution of
relative frequencies as observed in the ￿rst round of the experiment. When obtaining the
frequency distribution of ￿rst-round data we pool the data across contract conditions as
￿rst-round choices do not signi￿cantly di￿er. In particular, the initial levels of attraction















where e fj = fj=kfk)1=m and fj is the frequency of observing action j in the ￿rst round.
We investigate the reinforcement learning model as a special case of the EWA model.
For that we impose the restrictions  = 0, so that non-experienced payo￿s do not in￿uence
attractions, and  = 1, so that the count of experienced choices is irrelevant. With these
restrictions attraction levels simplify to the reinforcement levels of the RI model with
gradual forgetting as studied in Roth and Erev (1995). Unlike Roth and Erev (1995)
we continue using the logistic form for mapping the reinforcement levels into the choice
probabilities to facilitate parameter comparisons. 18
4.2.2 Estimation results
We use maximum-likelihood estimation to quantify the parameters of the EWA and RI
learning models. Table 4 reports the estimation results. The signi￿cant estimates of  in
any contract condition and any learning model show that subjects do not randomly choose
e￿ort levels over the course of the experiment. Rather payo￿ di￿erences substantially
govern e￿ort choice behavior. The ￿t of the learning models as summarized by the BIC
shows that the EWA model explains the the data better than the RI model in any contract
condition.19
An important reason why the EWA model ￿ts the data better than the RI model
lies in the fact that EWA also allows for the updating of attractions if the corresponding
levels of e￿ort were not chosen. The signi￿cantly positive estimates of the introspection
discount factor  show, consistently across contract conditions, that our participants not
16In each treatment, the di￿erence between expected payo￿ and actual payo￿ is smaller than 0.5% of
the expected payo￿ on average. [ Referees: More detailed descriptive data is provided in table 6 in the
referee’s appendix D.2.]
17It is only possible to approximately reproduce the frequency distribution of ￿rst-round choices since
some e￿ort levels were not chosen in the experiment and it is infeasible to calibrate the attraction level
for the corresponding strategy such that the corresponding choice probability is zero.







19Note that the BIC corrects for increasing the number of parameters so that it is not simply the larger
number of parameters under EWA explaining the improved ￿t.
17Contract types     BIC
1) EWA
Standard debt contract 0:440 0:132 0:849 0:432 -709.25
(0.097) (0.023) (0.038) (0.139)
Equity 0:538 0:147 0:928 0:163 -584.21
(0.120) (0.025) (0.040) (0.075)
Non-monotonic contract 0:198 0:235 0:940 0:277 -744.51
(0.036) (0.057) (0.032) (0.072)
No repayment 0:066 0:411 0:884 0:503 -686.88
(0.012) (0.087) (0.026) (0.106)
2) Cum. Reinforcement
Standard debt contract 0:330 0 0:683 1 -758.90
(0.030) (0.036)
Equity 0:222 0 0:707 1 -626.98
(0.017) (0.034)
Non-monotonic contract 0:091 0 0:773 1 -767.26
(0.011) (0.027)
No repayment 0:029 0 0:816 1 -695.69
(0.003) (0.019)
Table 4: Parameter estimates of the EWA and the RI learning models
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. There is no standard error reported if the parameter is not
estimated but exogenously restricted to a value to obtain the RI model. BIC = LL 0:5klog(NT) where
k is the number of estimated parameters, N is the number of subjects, and T is the number of periods.
Levels of signi￿cance: *** signi￿cant at 1%, ** signi￿cant at 5%, * signi￿cant at 10.%.
only responded to the actually experienced payo￿s through choosing some e￿ort level but
also take into account non-experienced payo￿s through introspection.
If participants took into account, through introspection, all non-chosen e￿ort levels
in the same way as they are using chosen e￿ort, then the introspection discount factor 
would be equal to one. There would be no discounting of payo￿s and all attraction levels
would be updated in the same way independent of the actual e￿ort choice. In contrast,
the estimates of  show that introspection is limited as the estimates are much smaller
in magnitude than one for any contract condition (Table 4). Therefore, experiencing the
implications of the actual e￿ort choice is essential in all contract conditions including
NMC and NoRepay where average behavior starts out in the vicinity of the optimal value
(Figure 1). We summarize our ￿ndings on learning incentives as follows.
Result 3. Experiencing the implications of e￿ort choice is essential for incentive e￿ects
of funding contracts to take e￿ect. Incentive e￿ects are learned through experience in
all contract conditions and a￿ect behavior increasingly with the accumulation of prior
exposure.
184.3 Standard debt contract vs non-monotonic contract
In this section we take a closer look at the non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis. Would
the replacement of a standard debt contract by a repayment-equivalent non-monotonic
contract reduce e￿ciency losses and increase entrepreneurial income as predicted? Fig-
ure 3 shows the average incomes obtained under both contracts for each round. It is easy
to see that entrepreneurial income in the NMC condition is much greater than in the SDC
condition. Using data of the last part of the experiment, rounds 11-15, we ￿nd that NMC
income exceeds SDC income by 170%.20
Result 4. Observed entrepreneurial income (net of e￿ort cost and repayment) under the
non-monotonic contract is on average 170% greater than under the standard debt contract


























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Non−monotonic contract Standard debt contract
Figure 3: Average round income of entrepreneurs under NMC and SDC
Using the two-tailed t-test for roundwise comparisons of entrepreneurial income (net
of agency costs and repayment) formally con￿rms that the income di￿erence is signi￿cant
in all ￿fteen rounds (p < 0:033) and highly signi￿cant in 13 out of 15 rounds (p < 0:006).21
Figure 4 illustrates how much additional total surplus would have been created in the
SDC treatment if, instead of the standard debt contract, a non-monotonic contract had
been used. The ￿gure reveals that in the ￿rst four rounds of the experiment, there is
20If earlier rounds are included, non-monotonic contracts perform even better, e.g. NMC income tops
SDC income by 360% on average if data for rounds 3-15 is used.
21Similarly the two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test indicates highly signi￿cant income di￿erence in 12 of















































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Round
SDC welfare loss first−best relative effort
SDC relative effort NMC relative effort
The ￿gure depicts the additional total surplus (in %) that is created on average if the
SDC is replaced by the corresponding NMC, given average e￿ort levels observed under both
contract conditions. This measure of welfare loss is shown as a series of bars (left scale).
Furthermore, the ￿gure illustrates average e￿ort observed in both contract conditions relative
to ￿rst-best e￿ort (right scale). Eg., in round 5, NMC average e￿ort exceeds ￿rst-best e￿ort
by roughly 10% while SDC average e￿ort falls short o￿ it by 40 %. Finally, the ￿rst-best
e￿ort benchmark (where total surplus is maximized) is represented by a horizontal line at
unity (right scale).
Figure 4: Welfare loss with a standard debt contract, but eliminable by a non-monotonic
contract
essentially no welfare disadvantage of the standard debt contract. 22 Clearly, these initial
e￿ort levels are suboptimal and yield negative round incomes, as is obvious from ￿gure 3.
In the course of the experiment, subjects in the SDC treatment reduce their e￿ort choices
towards the optimal level. As e￿ort levels in the SDC treatment decrease, the ine￿ciency
of the standard debt contracts grows sharply. Restricting attention to data from the last
part of the experiment (rounds 11-15) where e￿ort choices under SDC have stabilized
(see ￿gure 4), we ￿nd that the use of the non-monotonic contract would have increased
total surplus in the SDC treatment by approximately 30%. Total surplus in the NMC
treatment is signi￿cantly greater than in the SDC treatment in all of these ￿ve rounds
(t-test, p < 0:058, two-tailed).23
22In the ￿rst two rounds, SDC welfare is even slightly higher than NMC welfare. This is due to
the fact that quite large e￿ort levels are initially chosen in the SDC treatment, similar to those e￿ort
levels observed in the NMC treatment, but somewhat closer to ￿rst-best e￿ort which is indicated by the
horizontal line in the Figure.
23Mann-Whitney U test, p < 0:057, two-tailed.
20Result 5. Standard debt contracts lead to allocative ine￿ciencies that can be eliminated
by using repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contracts (support for hypothesis 3).
5 Concluding remarks
We examined the incentive e￿ects inherent to funding contracts experimentally. Surpris-
ingly, at the beginning of the experiment we found no incentive e￿ects at all: e￿ort is the
same independent of the contract condition. This shows that there are limits to grasping
incentive e￿ects through mere introspection. As experience with the contract condition
accumulates, incentive e￿ects increasingly govern behavior. With su￿cient experience
behavior is largely consistent with the theoretical predictions so that the di￿erential in-
centive e￿ects of funding contracts apply in the long run. As a consequence we also ￿nd
support for the non-monotonic-contracts hypothesis.
The ￿nding that experience crucially determines how the incentives of funding con-
tracts a￿ect behavior is of particular importance in our setting as real life entrepreneurs,
who are endowed with all sorts of ￿projects￿, di￿er in their experience. For example,
any entrepreneur requiring external ￿nance to start a project is inexperienced with the
implications of funding contracts at the beginning of the entrepreneurial career. Our
results suggest that no e￿ciency loss arises with standard debt or equity in these cases
due to limited introspection. The inexperienced entrepreneurs, however, su￿er from their
inexperience as they receive lower incomes than predicted due to ￿ling for bankruptcy
less often and repaying to the investor more often than is expected. Depending on the
individual entrepreneur and the particular project(s), there are entrepreneurs who accu-
mulate experience with the incentive e￿ects of funding contracts over the course of their
careers. In contrast to the inexperienced ones, we provide evidence that ine￿ciencies
arise with the experienced entrepreneurs under the standard debt contract and the equity
contract. Replacing these contracts by non-monotonic contracts would mitigate the losses
in allocative e￿ciency. One possibility of setting up non-monotonic contracts is to com-
bine a standard debt contract with bonus payments of the investor to the entrepreneur
conditional on reaching relatively high return states.
Interestingly our data allows us to see if the learning of incentives applies not only
globally but also locally. The estimation of the EWA model revealed that exposure to
experience matters if behavior starts out far away from the optimal e￿ort choice as in
the SDC and Equity conditions. This type of global learning should be expected as the
rewards from learning, that is the payo￿s when moving into the direction of optimal
choice, increase in the distance of actual choice to optimal choice. If actual choice begins
in the neighborhood of optimal choice, it might be less obvious if exposure would matter.
The EWA estimates show, however, that increasing exposure to incentives also matters if
choice behavior starts out in the neighborhood of the optimal e￿ort level as in the NMC
and NoRepay conditions.
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23Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof.
Consider any standard debt contract ~ t such that tn 1 < zn 1. It follows feasibility of
small changes of the contract structure such that dtn 1 =  pn(e x)=pn 1(e x)dtn > 0. The
resulting contract structure is non-monotonic since under the SDC repayments in the two
highest revenue states are the same while under the modi￿ed contract repayment in the
highest revenue state is smaller than that in the second-highest. Examining the e￿ect of




















where the ￿rst factor is negative by strictly positive probability in state n and second
order condition SOC 
Pn
i=1 p00
i(e x)zi   c00(e x)  
Pn
i=1 p00
i(e x)ti<0, and the second factor is
negative by MLRP. Therefore, the modi￿ed repayment structure induces the entrepreneur
to exert more e￿ort than exerting under the considered SDC.
The increase of e￿ort implies greater total surplus due to the fact that total surplus
is strictly increasing in e￿ort on [0; x] and e￿ort under any SDC satis￿es e x < x. Since
marginal repayment under any SDC is strictly positive, the expected repayment, denoted





















Evidently, expected repayment can be reduced to the level prevailing under the considered
SDC by decreasing repayment in every state by the same amount so that optimal e￿ort
and total surplus do not change. Therefore, there exist non-monotonic contracts that are
superior to the considered SDC in terms of total surplus and entrepreneurial pro￿t. 
B Instructions (Translation from German)
[Part I:] General explanations for participants
You are now participating in an economic experiment that is ￿nanced by METEOR.
If you carefully read the following explanations, you can earn a substantial amount of
money, contingent on your decisions. Therefore, it is very important that you read these
explanations carefully.
The instructions handed out to you are for your private information only.During the
experiment there is a strict prohibition of any kind of communication. If you do not abide
by this rule, you will be excluded from the experiment as well as any payments. If you
24have any question, please, raise your arm. We will then answer your question COMING
TO YOUR CUBICLE.
During the experiment we will not count in Euros but in ECU (Experimental Currency
Units). Therefore, your total earnings will ￿rst be calculated in ECU. The total amount
of ECU you attain during the experiment will be converted to Euros at the end of the
experiment and paid in cash.
[Part II:] Information regarding the experiment
The experiment today is divided into separate rounds. In total, there will be 15 rounds.
The following elaborations explain the course of action of the experiment for each round.
Each round, you undertake a new project and decide on how much e￿ort you want to
invest into the project. By choosing your e￿ort level, you determine the probabilities of
the project to attain a low, intermediate, or high revenue. At the same time, a higher
e￿ort choice leads to higher costs. Undertaking the project requires start-up costs of
ECU 3120. [The next two sentences were only included in the instructions for the SDC
condition, the NMC condition, and the EQUITY condition: As you do not dispose of the
start-up capital needed for the start-up investment, you have to raise the capital on the
capital market. You are acting under limited liability: in case your project revenue does
not cover the ￿xed repayment to the capital provider, only your project revenue will be
used for repayment, the remainder will be waived.] [The next two sentences were only
included in the instructions for the NoRepay condition: Undertaking the project requires
start-up costs of ECU 3120. You dispose of the necessary start-up capital and you do not
have to raise the capital on the capital market.]
Course of action At the beginning of each round, you are asked to set the e￿ort level
X for this round’s project. The e￿ort level cannot be negative or exceed 100, and may
only exhibit one decimal place.
The costs arising from your e￿ort are 1
2X2. The project revenue is random and may take
on a low, intermediate, or high level. By choosing your e￿ort level X, you can in￿uence
the probabilities for a low or a high project revenue. The higher your e￿ort level, the
lower the probability of a low revenue and the higher the probability of a high revenue.
In particular:
 probability of the low revenue of 500 ECU: 60%   X
100  60%
 probability of the intermediate revenue of 9,000 ECU: 40%
 probability of the high revenue of 10,000 ECU: X
100  60%
To ease calculating probabilities and e￿ort costs, on the input screen (see ￿gure 1 [ Please
see the ￿rst screenshot in the next section ]) you may enter any number of values into the
e￿ort entry ￿eld and have the according probabilities and e￿ort costs displayed by clicking
on the button ￿calculate probabilities￿. By clicking on the button ￿con￿rm choice￿, you
make your decision in this round irrevocable.
25[The following paragraph was only included in the instructions for the SDC condition:
Fixed repayment to the capital provider Out of the project revenue, the capital
provider receives ECU 7383.30 as ￿xed repayment for ￿nancing the project. In case the
project revenue does not cover the ￿xed repayment to the capital provider, you will only
repay the project revenue, the remainder will be waived.]
[The following paragraph was only included in the instructions for the NMC condition:
Fixed repayment to the capital provider Out of the project revenue, the capital
provider receives ECU 500 in case of a low revenue, ECU 9000 in case of an intermediate
revenue, and ECU 500 in case of a high revenue as a ￿xed repayment for ￿nancing the
project.]
[The following paragraph was only included in the instructions for the EQUITY condition:
Fixed repayment to the capital provider Out of the project revenue, the capital
provider receives ECU 362.50 in case of a low revenue, ECU 6525 in case of an intermediate
revenue, and ECU 7250 in case of a high revenue as a ￿xed repayment for ￿nancing the
project.]
[The following paragraph was only included in the instructions for the SDC condition:
Your project income Your project income equals the project revenue minus repayment
costs and minus e￿ort costs, i.e.:
 in case of a low revenue: 500   500   1
2X2 =  1
2X2 ECU.
 in case of an intermediate revenue: 9;000   7;383:30   1
2X2 = 1;616:70   1
2X2 ECU.
 in case of a high revenue: 10;000   7;383:30   1
2X2 = 2;616:70   1
2X2 ECU.]
[The following paragraph was only included in the instructions for the NMC condition:
Your project income Your project income equals the project revenue minus repayment
costs and minus e￿ort costs, i.e.:
 in case of a low revenue: 500   500   1
2X2 =  1
2X2 ECU.
 in case of an intermediate revenue: 9;000   9;000   1
2X2 =  1
2X2 ECU.
 in case of a high revenue: 10;000   500   1
2X2 = 9;500   1
2X2 ECU.]
[The following paragraph was only included in the instructions for the EQUITY condition:
Your project income Your project income equals the project revenue minus repayment
costs and minus e￿ort costs, i.e.:
 in case of a low revenue: 500   362:50   1
2X2 = 137:50   1
2X2 ECU.
 in case of an intermediate revenue: 9:000   6;525:00   1
2X2 = 2;475:00   1
2X2 ECU.
 in case of a high revenue: 10;000   7;250:00   1
2X2 = 2;750:00   1
2X2 ECU.]
[The following paragraph was only included in the instructions for the NoRepay condition:
Your project income Your project income equals the project revenue minus e￿ort costs,
i.e.:
26 in case of a low revenue: 500   1
2X2 ECU.
 in case of an intermediate revenue: 9;000   1
2X2 ECU.
 in case of a high revenue: 10;000   1
2X2 ECU.]
Number of projects and round income In each round, you will undertake 50 identical
projects. That is to say, by choosing your e￿ort level you do not determine the revenue
probabilities and e￿ort costs of a single project only, but those of 50 independent projects.
To this e￿ect, each project’s revenue will be determined by a random draw under the
probabilities determined by your e￿ort choice. All random draws are independent of
each other. You will be shown the number of projects with low, intermediate, and high
revenue as well as the project incomes on an informational screen (see ￿gure 2 [ Please see
the second screenshot in the following section ]). Your round income will be determined
as follows:
Your round income = average revenue of the 50 projects.
Payment At the end of the experiment you will be paid [in SDC, NMC, and EQUITY:
EUR 0.0004] [in NoRepay: EUR 0.00005] for each ECU on your ECU account. At the
beginning of the experiment, an initial endowment of [in SDC, NMC, and EQUITY: ECU
12500] [in NoRepay: ECU 100000] will be credited to your account to cover potential
losses. Each round, your round income will be added to your account, so that your
account balance either increases (in case of a positive round income) or decreases (in case
of a negative round income). You can avoid losses with certainty by making decisions
accordingly. In case your account balance falls below [ in SDC, NMC, and EQUITY:
ECU 2500] [in NoRepay: ECU 20000], you may not continue the experiment.
If you have any questions, please, let us know by raising your hand.
27C Screenshots
Figure 5 shows an input screen with hypothetical data for the SDC treatment. In the
screenshot used in the set of instructions given to subjects, there was no data available.
Figure 5: Input screen in the SDC treatment with hypothetical data (translation)
28Figure 6 shows the feedback screen with information about project outcomes and round
income. A similar screenshot, also with data substituted by letters ￿XXX￿, was used in
the set of instructions give to subjects.
Figure 6: Feedback screen from instructions in SDC treatment with erased data (transl.)
29D Referee’s Appendix
D.1 Results of the Mann-Whitney U test on treatment di￿erences
Contract condition NMC NoRepay EQUI
SDC xSDC < xNMC xSDC < xNoRepay xSDC = xEQUI
No. of sign. di￿s. 13 (p  0:026) 12 (p  0:074) 3 (p  0:090)
No. of insign. di￿s. 2 (p  0:229) 3 (p  0:191) 12 (p  0:185)
NMC xNMC = xNoRepay xNMC > xEQUI
No. of sign. di￿s. 1 (p = 0:088) 14 (p  0:025)
No. of insign. di￿s. 14 (p  0:133) 1 (p = 0:829)
NoRepay xNoRepay > xEQUI
No. of sign. di￿s. 14 (p  0:060)
No. of insign. di￿s. 1 (p = 0:600)
The table reports, for any pair of treatments, the results of roundwise Mann-Whitney U-tests. The
null hypothesis is that there is no di￿erence in the central location of average e￿ort observed in the
paired treatments. The alternative hypothesis is that there is one. For any comparison of treatments, the
theoretical comparative statics e￿ort prediction and the number of signi￿cant and insigni￿cant di￿erences
out of all of the 15 roundwise tests is reported together with the obtained highest and lowest p-values in
parenthesis.
Table 5: Summary of Mann-Whitney U-tests comparing average e￿ort across contract
conditions.
30D.2 Descriptive statistics on actual pro￿ts and expected pro￿ts
NoRepay Mean Std Dev Min Max
E[pro￿t] 5288.94 658.68 3417.50 7022.00
Actual pro￿t 5289.96 658.74 3417.50 7022.00
E[pro￿t] Actual pro￿t 1.01 6.88 -30.88 41.88
(E[pro￿t] Actual pro￿t)/E[pro￿t] 0.0002 0.001 -0.0051 0.0089
SDC Mean Std Dev Min Max
E[pro￿t] 319.24 759.46 -2843.30 980.52
Actual pro￿t 319.74 759.07 -2843.30 980.52
E[pro￿t] Actual pro￿t 0.51 3.59 -12.35 26.66
(E[pro￿t] Actual pro￿t)/E[pro￿t] 0.0009 0.009 -0.0287 0.0709
NMC Mean Std Dev Min Max
E[pro￿t] 1423.98 756.05 -74.50 3487.50
Actual pro￿t 1426.12 756.19 -74.50 3487.50
E[pro￿t] Actual pro￿t 2.15 8.51 -19.85 46.88
(E[pro￿t] Actual pro￿t)/E[pro￿t] 0.0024 0.0126 -0.011 0.1412
EQUI Mean Std Dev Min Max
E[pro￿t] 780.82 752.99 -2338.00 1559.50
Actual pro￿t 781.32 753.29 -2338.00 1559.50
E[pro￿t] Actual pro￿t 0.50 2.39 -9.95 16.38
(E[pro￿t] Actual pro￿t)/E[pro￿t] 0.0004 0.0021 -0.0090 0.0166
The table reports descriptive statistics of each subjects actual pro￿ts and expected pro￿ts in each round
of the experiment. All reported data are given in ECU except for the relative di￿erence. The data shows
that actual pro￿ts are very close to the expected pro￿ts conditional on chosen e￿ort.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics on actual pro￿ts and expected pro￿ts.
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